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Abstract— National assets such as transportation networks, 
large manufacturing, business and health facilities, power 
generation, and distribution networks are critical infrastructures. 
The cyber threats to these infrastructures have increasingly 
become more sophisticated, extensive and numerous. Cyber 
security conventional measures have proved useful in the past 
but increasing sophistication of attacks dictates the need for 
newer measures. The autonomic computing paradigm mimics the 
autonomic nervous system and is promising to meet the latest 
challenges in the cyber threat landscape. This paper provides a 
brief review of autonomic computing applications for SCADA 
systems and proposes architecture for cyber security. 
Keywords—Critical infrastructures; Machine learning; Cyber 
attacks; Architecture; Autonomic computing; SCADA security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems are used to monitor and control complex 
infrastructures of national importance such as transportation 
networks, power generation and manufacturing plants. Even 
the smallest intrusions on the critical infrastructure controls, 
can result in malfunctions which have devastating ripple effects 
on the system as a whole.  
Traditionally, SCADA systems have been developed as 
closed systems [1] with security being the overriding factor, 
with no Internet connectivity. However, to leverage efficiency 
and gain a competitive advantage, the systems are increasingly 
becoming connected to the Internet and cloud technologies [2]. 
SCADA system security vulnerabilities were first highlighted 
by the Stuxnet [3] attack. Subsequently, there has been an 
increase in the frequency and sophistication as evidenced by 
the recent attacks [4]. 
Isolation and obscurity [5] as a mechanism for protection is 
no longer an option for critical infrastructures. At the same 
time systems are getting so complex that it is difficult to 
develop effective defence strategies, as there is a lesser 
understanding of the complex interactions between the many 
system entities. The systems complexity and interactions as a 
result of interconnectivity goes beyond the capability of system 
developers and integrators [6]. Thus increasingly there is a lack 
of full understanding of the system which makes it very 
difficult to tune a system and to make decisions in case of 
changed requirements.  
This has led to a realization that conventional and rigid 
techniques will not help. What is needed is a new way of 
looking at the problem of cyber security that is robust, 
manageable and self-realising with a minimum requirement to 
monitor systems to make decisions. What is proposed is an 
entirely new way of thinking about the problem where the 
system itself is intelligent and helps to maintain and extend its 
behaviour, with the use of autonomic computing [6].  
The term ‘Autonomic Computing’ was first used by IBM in 
2001 to combat the looming complexity crisis [7]. The concept 
has been inspired by human biological autonomic system. An 
autonomic system is self-healing, self-regulating, self-
optimising and self-protecting [7]. Therefore, the system 
should be able to protect itself against both malicious attacks 
and unintended mistakes by the operator. We propose to 
generally use the autonomic computing paradigm features to 
SCADA system security, in particular focussing on self-
protecting SCADA systems. 
The basic principles of autonomic computing are very 
much applicable to increasingly complex SCADA system 
protection because: (i) The boundaries between physical and 
virtual systems have been blurred through virtualisation. It is 
possible to host a cluster of machines in a virtual environment; 
(ii) Even with hardware there are sufficient advances in other 
domains with self-healing materials; (iii) Advances in machine 
learning and artificial intelligence, for protection, and the 
knowledge base needs to be capitalised; (iv) The systems are 
highly interconnected and the distributed nature of systems 
poses an exponential complexity. 
There has been some research on autonomic computing 
application to complex SCADA systems. The application of 
autonomic computing for smart grids has been discussed [8] as 
a solution to manage system complexities. Key components of 
a self-protecting SCADA system have been proposed and a 
survey of techniques provided for the realisation of such 
systems [9]. Also, there are few dedicated research groups [10], 
[11] focusing research on the applicability. JADE [12] provides 
a framework for building autonomic management systems.  A 
test bed was developed [10][13] for modelling critical 
infrastructures for testing autonomic technologies. However, 
there is a lot of work required before the full potential of 
autonomic computing for SCADA security can be realised.   
 This paper reviews the literature relating to the application 
of autonomic computing to SCADA system protection and 
proposes an architecture that can support cyber security against 
emerging threats providing support at various stages or layers.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
outlines the relevant background on SCADA security aspects.  
  
Fig. 1. Simplified Layered Architecture of a SCADA system. 
 
Threat landscape and the need for better protective techniques 
are described in Section III and IV. Section V provides the 
relevant information on autonomic computing. The proposed 
architecture is presented in Section VI and finally Section VII 
concludes the paper. 
 
II. SCADA AS SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
SCADA systems have been adopting the latest trends and 
innovations, such as virtualisation, analytics and databases, and 
wireless communications, which must work together in close 
collaboration to achieve the system mission. SCADA databases 
contain big data [14] and need sophisticated techniques for 
timely and meaningful inferences to detect outliers. The 
integrated framework can rightly be called systems of systems 
as the complexity has increased beyond simple control and 
monitoring tasks, the fundamental basis of SCADA. This 
complexity implies that developing and maintaining such 
systems are reaching the limits of human cognition [6][15]. 
A. System Architecture 
A SCADA system can be visualised as a layered 
architecture, as shown in Figure 1. The field devices (sensors 
etc.) at the lowest layer interact with the physical processes. At 
layer 2, The Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), and 
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) aggregate data values from the 
lower layer and communicate the commands and their 
responses through the communications network to the SCADA 
server and Human Machine Interface (HMI). It is through the 
generation of commands at the top layer and collection of 
responses from the lowest layer that result in monitoring and 
control of the process. 
B. SCADA System Characteristics 
 SCADA applications are hosted on generic operating 
systems and tend to have a long operational lifetime. 
 With lots of added features the systems complexities 
have increased and are thus difficult to maintain [1]. 
 The systems remain in continuous operation and have a 
range of redundancies incorporated to protect stalling 
the system for foreseeable problems. 
 The command and response relies on tight timing 
constraints. 
 The system is susceptible to attacks with minor effects, 
which can alter the system behaviour in a negative 
manner, leading to a ripple effect that compromises the 
whole system. 
III. THREAT LANDSCAPE 
The threat landscape is rapidly evolving and has gained 
momentum where the state and non-state agents are trying to 
exploit the system’s vulnerabilities. For detailed threat 
ontologies please refer to [13]. There are many paths to 
exploitation but the threats can be categorised into the 
following main categories: 
A. Internet Connectivity 
The protection offered through an unconnected SCADA 
system is not there anymore. The benefits are too lucrative to 
be ignored by vendors and industry. Unfortunately it comes at 
an increased threat exposure.  
B. Cloud Computing 
The increasing reliance of moving the computing and 
networking assets to the cloud could create a hurdle for a 
SCADA system. Although this depends upon the amount of 
data moved to the cloud it definitely imposes certain system 
constraints to be violated, in case of disconnection from data 
stored in remote cloud infrastructure. 
C. Wireless Communications 
There are many publicly available tools that can capture 
network traffic wirelessly. Also the wireless devices that feed 
data to the SCADA system provide easy entry points for the 
intruder into the system because the end devices do not have 
adequate protection, due to very low power requirements. 
D. System Composition 
 There are many complex technologies underpinning a 
modern SCADA system. The system interactions are complex 
and open new threat entry points as there are many third party 
libraries and hardware assembled with components from 
around the world, with exploitable threats such as backdoors, 
often unknown to the SCADA system vendor.  
E. Social Engineering Attacks 
Sophisticated attacks where the passwords and other details 
are stolen posing as an authorised agent or person. Threats 
could also emanate from an innocent or deliberate mistake 
from an insider. In the current threat scenario, ransomware may 
be a motivation to exploit a system. Although WannaCry [16] 
did not specifically target a SCADA system but raises a lot of 
questions about SCADA systems vulnerabilities that could 
make them lucrative target for ransomware.  
IV. NEED FOR  BETTER PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
System protection can be ensured through many 
techniques. The majority depend on the judgement of a human 
to provide safeguards for the system.  
The cyber attack paradigms have progressed much beyond 
the simple attack methodologies such as man-in-the-middle 
(MITM), Denial of Service (DOS) attacks [9] and are waged 
with increasing sophistication to hide detection. The traditional 
defence approaches such as firewalls are unable to cope with 
the latest attack methodologies where for example, the system 
parameters are altered, and are individually legitimate, but on 
the whole result in system collapse. Firewall configuration is a 
complicated task that requires automated setting as proposed in 
[17]. 
Machine learning and other such techniques can effectively 
analyse a system to detect anomalous activity in a system. Such 
unsupervised anomaly detection schemes are more appropriate 
and efficient compared to human analysts [18] and other 
signature based approaches [9]. The system can thus learn new 
approaches and provide defence against as yet unseen 
scenarios, as in case of supervised learning approaches. The 
other techniques of interest could be based on agent based, 
artificial intelligence, and adaptive systems [8]. The future of 
cyber security lies with exploiting such techniques that can not 
only autonomously assess the threats to the system security, but 
also contain and mitigate the threat from spreading resulting in 
more damage. The operator alert can notify the human operator 
to initiate disaster recovery operations.  
A recent breakthrough in this direction is that of the 
Autonomic Computing paradigm. With Autonomic 
Computing, the ultimate control still rests with a human but the 
drudgery of data manipulation and threat assessment can be 
taken out of the loop. Autonomic computing has been applied 
for resource optimisation for cloud [19] arguing that the 
traditional management techniques cannot handle availability 
and security, these being complex problems for traditional 
approaches. 
Autonomic computing systems have four main features: 
self-configuring; self-healing; self-optimising; and self-
protecting [7].  
V. AUTONOMIC COMPUTING PARADIGM 
The core of the Autonomic Computing paradigm is that the 
system should be intelligent to enable it to develop and 
maintain itself in an optimised state.  
A. Basis in Human Nervous System 
The human body’s feedback and control mechanisms 
[6][20] have formed the basis of general systems theory and 
holism for the development and management of computer 
based systems. The autonomic computing paradigm mimics 
the autonomic human nervous system. The ability to self-
manage SCADA system security threats by developing 
learning systems that recognise vulnerabilities will be hugely 
advantageous. The agents and software services will form a 
part of the systems, gathering data and monitoring systems 
continuously [21].  
B. Basic Functions 
Autonomic computing can result from the use of different 
technologies; however an autonomic system must demonstrate 
the following features [7]:  
1) Self-configuring: The system must be able to reconfigure 
its behaviour based on the changing system requirements. For 
example, to acquire more system resources, such as memory,  
in case the system is overburdened. 
2) Self-healing: In response to detecting a compromised 
element in its configurtion, or lack of resources, an autonomic 
system can respond by repairing itself to a good state. Based 
on this assessment the system should be able to, for example, 
isolate the system components that have been compromised 
and continue operation with the remaining elements and at the 
same time attemping to restore the compromised system 
elements. 
3) Self-optimising: The system must be able to assess the 
current state of the system variables and be abe to tune them to 
result in an optimised tuned behaviour. This is crucial as in the 
case of complex systems there are thousands of system 
parameters that can affect the system performance. Knowing 
or applying them all for best results is beyond the grasp of 
human mind, in a resonable amount of time. 
4) Self-protecting: The system should be aware of the 
normal system operation and be able to continuously monitor 
the current system state to determine when deviations occur. It 
can then take measures to contain the threat and take measures 
to handle it  
C. Application for SCADA Security 
Autonomic computing facilitates identifying factors that 
relate to a specific state – homeostasis. The development of a 
knowledge network will help to identify what ‘homeostasis’ is 
and when there is an imbalance, to understand the structure of 
the network, the defences, the threats and the attacks.  The 
threats can be classified into two categories: 1) process-
related: when valid credentials are used to make legitimate 
changes that can impact on industrial processes. These can 
also be due to an error in the input of incorrect values or an 
actual attack [22] by, for example, disgruntled employees; and 
2) system-related: which are exploited via software or 
configuration vulnerabilities. For example, flaws in 
communication protocols, which are low level (layers 1 and 2) 
attacks on the SCADA architecture [23].  Developing a 
mechanism to mine logged data on process-related incidents is 
a potential solution to developing an autonomic computing 
approach for SCADA security. Identifying user activities and 
classifying the actions into signed-on or known user actions 
allows the analysis of threats as legitimate system commands 
by legitimate users, or by illegitimate users, to distinguish the 
threats into attacks or errors by developing a knowledge base. 
[24].  
The work to date for securing SCADA security focuses on 
discrete approaches. However, we propose an integrated 
approach that combines, the discrete knowledge based 
approaches with cognitive approaches. The memory
 
 
     Fig 2. Proposed Architecture for an autonomic SCADA system. 
layer of the Layered Reference Model of the Brain (LRMB) 
(layer 2), reflects the knowledge base that captures the short 
term, long term and transient memories. This can be utilised to 
capture process- and systems-related threats. Memory can be 
defined as a set of subconscious cognitive processes that 
retains the external or internal information about various 
SCADA security events. The subconscious knowledge base is 
inherited from the range of events and threats identified, and 
the conscious subsystem, however, is acquired and flexible, 
based on the autonomic computing paradigm [25][26].  
Thus the autonomic paradigm holds great promise to 
address the general security problems associated with the 
SCADA systems.  
 
VI. AUTONOMIC ARCHITECTURE FOR SCADA SECURITY 
A. SCADA Features  
Some recent technology adoptions and improvements in the 
SCADA systems are promising to aid developing systems that 
can result in an autonomic SCADA system. 
1) Databases: Most SCADA vendors allow integration with 
relational databases in addition to the built-in Historian 
databases that have some advantages [27]. Relational 
databases such as Oracle have their own integrated analytics 
and data mining services that can make it easier to uncover 
any anomalous activity. 
2) Machine Learning: The machine learning and data 
analytics techniques have revolutionised many application 
domains and and have recently been introduced in SCADA 
applications software. Such native integration makes it easier 
for the SCADA developers to analyse the  system operation 
and identify impending attacks [28][29].  
3) Virtualisation: Virtualisation techniques provide many 
benefits that can advantageously be applied to support the 
autonomic computing paradigm. Virtualisation enables easy 
containment of an attack, restoring and disaster recovery, 
change and optimisation of system resources etc. in a truly 
elastic manner.  
B. Proposed Architecture 
An autonomic system should enable a SCADA system to 
optimise, configure and protect itself in case of changing 
system state. The SCADA system entities are generally spread 
over a large geographical area, thus necessitating 
synchronisation of information at each location. This 
necessitates an autonomic manager at each location that can 
monitor the security in the local areas and coordinate the 
efforts through the overall system manager. 
A simplified architecture is shown in Figure 2. We propose 
hosting the SCADA system on a virtual platform. The 
advantages are that it can provide high availability through 
protection against hardware and software failures. At the heart 
of the system is a central autonomic manager that can enforce 
the broad hardware and software policies in the managed 
system as dictated by the system administrator. The knowledge 
base provides the various system models that can be analysed 
to check conformance. The local autonomic managers 
continually observe the system state and act promptly in case 
of identified security threats to the local system. 
Some autonomic architectures have been proposed in the 
research literature. The IBM autonomic computing system 
comprises, monitoring, analysing, planning, executing and 
knowledge base component [30].  An architecture for an 
autonomic element as a smallest functional unit is proposed by 
Parashar and Hariri [20]. Chen and Abdelwahed [9] present an 
autonomic security model comprising of risk assessment, early 
warning and prevention, intrusion detection, and intrusion 
response. A detailed survey of autonomic computing models 
and applications is provided in [15]. A multi-tiered 
architecture [14] for QoS-aware autonomic cloud computing 
was suggested by Singh et al. The OPC (Open Platform 
Communications) forensics and analytics platform has been 
proposed by Amrein et al. which can be used with autonomic 
computing. HAMIDS system that can automatically detect 
threats from the network traffic has been proposed by Ghaeini 
et al. [31]. In contrast our proposed architecture provides a 
broad generalised structure based on virtualisation wherein 
appropriate technologies can be selected to best suit an 
application within the given framework. The identification of 
anomalies at an area level helps to counter the threats locally, 
relieving the central autonomic manager to take more holistic 
actions to counter system wide threats. 
It is also pertinent to point out here that the autonomic 
manager itself can be the target of a cyber attack. Such 
exploitation can be avoided through redundant deployments of 
managers and an integrated approach as proposed.     
VII. CONCLUSION 
The evolving cyber threat landscape dictates changes to 
defence approaches. Unlike the traditional defence approaches 
where the response is governed by tailoring and monitoring 
according to threat, the concept of autonomic computing 
provides an advantage, as the systems are self-protecting. 
Although the autonomic computing paradigm has been 
around for some time, its applications to real computer 
applications and SCADA applications in particular have been 
very limited. With the current pace of development and 
adoption of techniques ultimately the promise of a self-
protecting SCADA system will be realised. With a fully 
developed autonomic computing system, the technology itself 
would take over the decision-making from the human system 
administrators and operators. Ultimately the technology will 
blend within the system [6] as has happened for mobile phones, 
hiding the technical details of communication from anywhere 
and anytime.  
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